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LABOR LAW-State Court Jurisdiction Over Employee's 
Damage Action Against Union for Failure To 
Process Fully Grievance Is Not Pre-empted 
by the NLRB-Sipes v. Vaca* 
Plaintiff, discharged by his employer on the ground that he was 
no longer physically able to work, enlisted the aid of his union to 
contest the dismissal. Under the provisions of the collective bargain-
ing agreement between the union and the employer, the union was 
to seek redress of employee complaints by means of a five step 
grievance procedure, with arbitration as the final step. The union 
processed plaintiff's grievance without success through the first four 
steps of the procedure, but refused to take the issue to the arbitral 
level. Plaintiff brought suit against the union in a Missouri county 
circuit court, claiming damages sustained as a result of the union's 
"arbitrary" and "capricious" refusal to process fully his grievance.1 
The jury awarded actual and punitive damages, but the court set 
aside the verdict on the ground that the jurisdiction of the state 
court had been pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB). The Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed.2 On appeal 
to the Missouri Supreme Court, held, reversed and jury verdict re-
instated. A discharged employee's suit against his union based upon 
its wrongful refusal to process fully his grievance is a purely internal 
union matter, and, as such, is not subject to pre-emption by the 
NLRB. 
The United States Supreme Court has derived from section 9 of 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which grants to a major-
ity union powers of exclusive representation, a duty on the part of 
the union "to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf 
of all whom it represents."3 This statutory duty of fair representa-
tion, although occasionally supplemented by common law concepts 
of tort or contract,4 has become the individual employee's primary 
• 397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1965) [hereinafter referred to as principal case]. 
I. Plaintiff claimed that the union officials arbitrarily and wrongfully demanded 
$l!OO from him before they would carry his grievance to the fifth step. The union 
denied that such a demand had been made and asserted that the grievance had been 
dropped in good faith for lack of adequate medical evidence. 
2. Owens v. Vaca, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. 1[ 19613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). While appeal to 
the Missouri Supreme Court was pending, plaintiff died and his administrator re-
placed him as plaintiff. 
3. Steele v. Louisville & N. Ry., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944). 
4. Prior to the birth of the § 9 theory, the union's duty of fair representation was 
construed by the courts in terms of various common law concepts. Employees were 
described as third party beneficiaries under the bargaining contract, as principals in 
an agency relation with the union, and as cestuis que trustent to whom a fiduciary 
duty was owed by the trustee union. Although today, federal law probably dominates 
the area of individual rights in the bargaining process, the states are not bound to 
a § 9 interpretation of the duty and the field has not been formally pre-empted. 
See Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions, 
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protection against arbitrary or discriminatory union activity.11 The 
alleged conduct of the defendant union in the principal case-fail-
ure to represent fairly a member in the grievance procedure-con-
stituted a clear-cut breach of this duty. 6 Thus, the fundamental 
question presented by the principal case is whether an individual 
employee, aggrieved by his union's breach of its duty of fair rep-
resentation, may sue the union for damages in a state judicial forum 
or whether such an action is within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the NLRB. 
The general rule which defines the respective jurisdictions of 
the courts and the NLRB was enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.1 In Garmon, the 
Court held that in order to avoid judicial interference with national 
labor policy, the state and federal courts must defer to the exclu-
sive competence of the NLRB whenever the activity which is the 
subject matter of litigation is arguably prohibited by section 8 or 
protected by section 7 of the NLRA. Until recently, an application 
of this general rule to the facts in the principal case would have re-
sulted in the sustaining of state court jurisdiction. Traditionally, 
a union's breach of its duty of fair representation was not considered 
to constitute activity prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA.8 In 
Union Officials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HAsnNcs L.J. 891, 895-99 
(1964). However, if the Miranda theory, see notes 11-20 infra and accompanying text, 
or the § 301 theory, see notes 43-50 infra and accompanying text, are ultimately fully 
accepted, state law may become obsolete in the area. 
5. The statutory duty of fair representation originated in cases involving the Rail-
way Labor Act. See, e.g., Tunstall v . .Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 828 U.S. 
210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville &: N. Ry., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Subsequently, the 
duty was found in § 9 of the NLRA on the rationale that the power of exclusive 
representation conferred by that section on the unions could not be absolute but 
must be limited by a fiduciary obligation to wield the power with fairness to all. See 
Syres v. Local 123, Oilworkers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 
345 U.S. 330 (1953); Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182, 185 
(9th Cir. 1962); Durandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 195 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Mich. 1961). 
See generally Blum.rosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative 
and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REY. 1485, 1519-
20 (1963); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REY. 151 (1957); Hanslowe, 
The Collective Agreement and the Duty of Fair Representation, 14 LAB. L.J. 1052 
(1963); Summexs, Individual Rights in Collective Bargaining Agreements and Arbitra-
tion, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 862 (1962); Comment, Federal Protection of Individual Rights 
Under Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215 (1964). But cf. Humphrey v. Moore, 875 
U.S. 335 (1964), wherein the Supreme Court indicates that the duty is derived from 
the collective bargaining agreement. 
6. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 343 (1964); Mendicki v. UAW, 61 
L.R.R.M. 2142 (D. Kan. 1965); Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1215, 1219 (1964). 
7. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
8. Section 8(b)(l) of the NLRA designates as an unfair labor practice union 
conduct that restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights. But, 
because § 7 was not considered to contain a right of fair representation, § S(b)(l) did 
not reach a union's arbitrary treatment of its members. Section 8(b)(2) prohibits union 
action which causes an employer to discriminate against an employee. However, the 
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fact, the NLRB itself had expressly denied that such a breach was an 
unfair labor practice over which it could exercise jurisdiction.9 
Thus, responsibility for protecting the individual employee against 
arbitrary or invidious union action rested exclusively with the state 
and federal courts.10 · 
In 1962, in Miranda Fuel Co.,11 the NLRB reversed its earlier 
position and held that a union's breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion is an unfair labor practice.12 Specifically, the Board decided 
that section S(b)(l) of the NLRA prohibits a union from taking 
action against its members on considerations that are arbitrary, 
irrelevant, or invidious.13 Subsequent NLRB decisions expressly ex-
courts require that the discrimination involved be of such a nature that it would 
encourage or discourage union membership. This was usually construed to mean 
that the discriminatory conduct had to be based upon union-connected activity. See, 
e.g., NLRB v. Local 294, Teamsters Union, 317 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1963). Thus, the broad 
area of union arbitrary or invidious action toward members not based upon union 
membership was outside the scope of the federal labor laws. It was this type of union 
action which was involved in the principal case. 
9. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), the NLRB filed an amicus 
curiae brief in which it argued that the Board did not have jurisdiction over fair 
representation cases. 
10. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 294, Teamsters Union, 317 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1963); 
Durrandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 195 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Mich. 1961); Berman v. National 
Maritime Union, 166 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 
1470-72, 1504; Rosen, supra note 4, at 395-409; Sovern, Section JOI and the Primary 
Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REv. 529, 548 (1963); cf. Hiller v. Local 2, 
Liquor Salesmen's Union, 338 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1964). 
11. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962). A union member had been absent from work because 
of illness. Although the absence was excusable, the union demanded that the employer 
reduce the member's seniority. The employer acquiesced to this demand and the mem-
ber filed unfair labor practice charges against both the union and the employer. 
12. The Board's change of attitude toward fair representation cases, see note 9 
supra and accompanying text, may be attributed to the fact that the courts had 
proven to be an unsatisfactory forum for the protection of individual rights in the 
collective bargaining process. The Supreme Court had developed a broad standard of 
fairness, Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), which the lower courts had 
applied with a heavy presumption in favor of union reasonableness, thereby virtually 
precluding a finding of a breach of its duty. Other prohibitive factors were the time, 
expense and procedural problems involved in a judicial action. See Blumrosen, supra 
note 5, at 1470-72, 1514-15; Herring, The Fair Representation Doctrine: An Effective 
Weapon against Racial Discrimination, 24 MD. L. REv. 113 (1964); Rosen, Fair Repre-
sentation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations; Unions, Union Officials and 
the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HAsTINGS L.J. 391, 399-409 (1964); Rosen, 
Individual Worker in the Grievance Procedure, Still Another Look at the Problem, 24 
MD. L. REv. 233, 286-89 (1964). For discussion of a series of New York decisions that 
effectively cut off the individual's recourse to the judicial forum, see Hanslowe, supra 
note 5, at 1054-58. 
13. The revolutionary aspect of the Board's holding is that it entailed reading into 
§ 7 of the NLRA a duty of fair representation. See note 8 supra. Section 7 gives 
workers the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. 
Section 9 had formerly been construed to impose on the unions a duty to act fairly 
on behalf of all their members. Reading the two sections together, the Board con-
cluded that implicit in the § 7 right to bargain collectively is a right to bargain 
through representatives who will be bound by a duty of fairness. Thus, the union's 
duty of fair representation became a § 7 protected right. Since § 8(b)(l) prohibits 
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tended this theory to reach the type of union activity involved in 
the principal case: arbitrary or discriminatory refusal to process a 
grievance.14 Thus, if the Miranda rationale were applied to the 
principal case, the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim would 
arguably be an unfair labor practice, and, as such, subject to the 
pre-emptive rule of Garmon. The Board's new theory, however, has 
not yet been generally construed by the courts as necessitating a 
strict rule of pre-emption in all fair representation cases.15 The Su-
preme Court has on three occasions noted the existence of Miranda, 
but each time it has expressly refused to pass upon its validity.16 
Theoretically, until the Supreme Court ultimately rules on Miranda, 
the lower courts may avoid its pre-emptive implications by relying 
restraint of § 7 rights, it was an easy second step to find that any breach of the duty 
of fair representation is a violation of § 8(b)(l) and consequently an unfair labor 
practice. For a discussion of the implications of Miranda, see generally Murphy, The 
Duty of Fair Representation under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L. REv. 373 (1965); Comment, 
73 YALE L.J. 1215, 1234-38 (1964); Comment, 45 B.U.L. REv. 141 (1965). 
In deciding whether a union has, in fact, breached its duty, the Board will look 
to the true purpose of the union's actions. If the true purpose is deemed legitimate, 
incidental injurious effects on a particular member's rights will not be sufficient to 
establish a breach. See Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 1965 CCH NLRB 11 9760. The union 
must make an honest effort to serve all fairly without hostile discrimination to any, 
but the union must also be allowed a wide range of reasonableness within which to 
carry out its duties as bargaining agent. See Local 12, United Rubber ·workers Union, 
150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964). Applying this broad standard of fairness, the Board has been 
reluctant to find that a union's actions were sufficiently arbitrary or irrelevant to 
constitute a breach of duty. See, e.g., Local 10, Chicago Fed'n of Musicians, 1965 CCH 
NLRB 11 9456; Local 87, Houston Typographical Union, 145 N.L.R.B. 1657 (1964); 
Local 820, Armored Car Chauffers &: Guards Union, 145 NL.R.B. 225 (1963); Local 6, 
New York Typographical Union, 144 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1963). But see Local 12, Rubber 
Workers Union, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964); Local 1, Metal Workers Union, 147 N.L.R.B. 
1573 (1964). 
14. Local 1, Metal Workers Union (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); 
Local 12, Rubber Workers Union, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964). In both cases, Negro em-
ployees charged their union with having discriminatively refused to process their 
grievances. See generally Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair Representation and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L. REV. 771 (1965); Comment, 45 B.U.L. REv. 141 (1965). 
Subsequent board applications of the Miranda theory have made it clear that the 
theory is not confined to racial discrimination cases. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 1965 
CCH NLRB 11 9760; Local 10, Chicago Fed'n of Musicians, 1965 CCH NLRB 11 9456. 
15. The Board's order in Miranda was denied enforcement by the Second Circuit. 
NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Of the three judges writing 
opinions, only one expressly rejected the Board's reasoning. Cf. NLRB v. Local 294, 
Teamsters Unioi;i, 317 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1963). But see Cafero v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 115 
(2d Cir. 1964). The Board has made it clear that it will continue to follow Miranda 
until the Supreme Court rules otherwise. See Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 1965 CCH NLRB 
'J 9760; Local 12, United Rubber Workers Union, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964). 
The commentators have not agreed on the legal validity of Miranda or its policy 
justification. Compare, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 1504-23, Cox, supra note 5, 
at 172-73, and Comment, 2 HOUSTON L. REv. 373 (1965) (legislative history as support 
for Miranda), with, e.g., Comment, 45 B.U.L. REv. 141 (1965), Comment, 112 U. PA. 
L. REv. 711 (1963), Note, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1081 (1965), and Comment, 9 VILL. L. REv. 
306 (1964). 
16. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965); Humphrey v. Moore, 
375 U.S. 335, 344 (1964); Local 100, Plumbers Union v • .Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 696 
(1963). 
December 1966] Recent Developments 377 
upon the existing Supreme Court precedents for section 9 judicial 
jurisdiction.17 However, in light of the Board's continued adherence 
to the Miranda theory, it does seem that a union's breach of its duty 
of fair representation should be regarded as, at least, "arguably" 
an unfair labor practice.18 There is some judicial authority to this 
effect.19 Particularly relevant to the principal case is Chasis v. Pro-
gress Mfg. Co.,20 wherein a federal district court held that the 
wrongful refusal of a union to process fully a discharged employee's 
grievance was arguably an unfair labor practice and consequently 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 
In the principal case, the Missouri Supreme Court avoided what-
ever pre-emptive force Miranda may presently have by finding that 
the plaintiff's claim fell within an established exception to the gen-
eral pre-emption doctrine.21 The Supreme Court has recognized 
three such exceptions: (1) when the subject matter of an action in-
17. See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text. If the courts follow this approach, 
suits brought under § 9 of the NLRA to enforce the duty of fair representation may 
become an additional exception to the general pre-emption doctrine. However, the 
recent decision of the Supreme Court in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), 
indicates that the Court itself does not believe that Miranda can be avoided or dis-
credited solely through reliance upon the pre-Miranda precedents for judicial juris-
diction. In Humphrey, the Court found it necessary to construe an action for breach 
of the duty of fair representation as one arising under § 301 of the LMRA in order 
to by-pass the pre-emption questions raised by Miranda. Had the majority been 
willing simply to follow a § 9 theory, as was Mr. Justice Goldberg in dissent, there 
would have been no need to create an entirely new construction of§ 301. See Chasis v. 
Progress Mfg. Co., 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 11398 (E.D. Pa. 1966), wherein the court 
reasoned that since the § 9 theory had been developed prior to the existence of an 
administrative remedy, that theory should now be displaced by the Miranda rationale. 
18. The Section on Labor Relations Law of the American Bar Association re-
ported in 1965 that: 
violations of the duty of fair representation are arguably subject to sections 
7 or 8 of the Act. • • • [C]onsequently, unless court actions brought to enforce 
the NLRA's duty of fair representation are exempt from Garmon for some reason, 
the courts may no longer entertain them. 
Report of the Section of Labor Relations Law, 1964 A.B.A. REP. 147-48 (1965). 
19. See Mendicki v. UAW, 61 L.R.R.M. 2142 (D. Kan. 1965); Stout v. Construction 
8: Gen. Laborers Council, 226 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Knox v. UAW, 223 F. Supp. 
1009 (E.D. Mich. 1963); Goni-Moral v. Marley, 58 L.R.R.M. 2037 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1964); cf. Young v. United Steelworkers, 420 Pa. 132, 216 A.2d 500 (1966); Mccaul v. 
Local 107, Highway Truck-Drivers 8: Helpers Union, 47 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 18137 
(Pa. C.P. 1963). 
Some judicial support for Miranda may arguably be found in the recent fair 
representation cases in which § 301 of the LMRA has been employed to sustain juris-
diction. In relying on § 301 for this purpose the courts appear to be tacitly recog-
nizing the potential pre-emptive force of Miranda. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 
U.S. 335 (1964); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 355 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1966); Mandel 
v. Local 707, Teamsters Union, 246 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Tully v. Fred Olson 
Motor Serv., 27 Wis. 2d 476, 134 N.W.2d 393 (1965); notes 43-50 infra and accom-
panying text. 
20. 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 11398 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
21. The Miranda theory was relied on by the union as grounds for pre-emption. 
Sec Brief for Respondents, pp. 18-22. The court apparently rejected this argument: 
"[W]c do not think it could reasonably be argued that the conduct of the defendants 
constituted an unfair labor practice." Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658, 665 (Mo. Sup. 
Ct. 1965). 
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volves union conduct that threatens or constitutes physical violence 
or other breaches of the peace;22 (2) when a suit is brought under 
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA);23 and 
(3) when the subject matter of an action is a purely internal union 
matter which does not directly involve the employment relation.:?4 
A suit falling within any of these categories is not subject to pre-
emption and may be maintained in a state or federal court even if 
the activity involved is concededly protected by section 7 or pro-
hibited by section 8 of the NLRA.25 In the principal case, judicial 
jurisdiction was sustained on the ground that the subject matter of 
the suit fell within the third exception to the pre-emption rule. This 
exception was originally formulated prior to Garmon, in Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales.26 In Gonzales, an individual 
employee, wrongfully expelled from his union, sued the union for 
restoration of membership and incidental damages. The Supreme 
Court recognized that the union's conduct might conceivably have 
constituted an unfair labor practice, but upheld state jurisdiction on 
the ground that the danger of conflict with national labor policy was 
too remote to justify depriving the plaintiff of a judicial remedy.21 
A year later, when the Court decided Garmon, it described Gon-
zales as a suit whose subject matter was merely a "peripheral con-
cern of the LMRA," and indicated that such suits would constitute 
an exception to the general pre-emption rule.28 This rather vague 
and potentially broad exception was subsequently substantially 
limited and given its present narrow definition in Plumber's Union 
v. Borden.29 The Borden Court described Gonzales as a 
suit focused on purely internal union matters, i.e., on relations be-
tween the individual plaintiff and the union, not having to do 
22. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum 
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). 
23. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 
U.S. 195 (1962). 
24. Local 100, Plumbers Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963); International Ass'n 
of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). 
25. See generally Smith & Clark, Reappraisal of the Role of the States in Shaping 
Labor Relations Law, 1965 WIS. L. R.Ev. 411, 418-21. 
26. 356 U.S. 617 (1958). 
27. The state court was empowered to award both reinstatement and damages. 
The NLRB could not order reinstatement but might have been able to award back 
pay if the union had been found to have wrongfully caused the discharge. See 
National Labor Relation Act § IO(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964). 
However, even if the board could award back pay, it could not impose punative 
damages nor give compensation for mental suffering. 
28. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959). 
29. 373 U.S. 690 (1963). In Borden, an individual member sued his union for 
damages arising from the union's wrongful refusal to refer him for employment. The 
member admitted the presence of that which might arguably be an unfair labor 
practice but relied on Gonzales to support state jurisdiction. The Court found the 
Gonzales rationale inapposite on the ground that the crux of the member's complaint 
was interference with employment opportunities, not injury to internal union rights. 
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directly with matters of employment, [in which] ... the principal 
relief sought was restoration of membership rights.30 
Application of the criteria developed by the Supreme Court in 
Borden to the facts of the principal case indicates that the disposi-
tion of the plaintiff's claim should not be controlled by the Gonzales 
exception. The failure of the union to process fairly the plaintiff's 
grievance did deprive him of his rights as a union member and, 
to this extent, the suit does directly involve the relationship between 
the aggrieved individual and his union. However, the focus of the 
plaintiff's claim is not this purely internal union matter. Restoration 
of membership rights was not the principal relief sought. Rather, 
the petition for relief reveals that the measure of actual damages 
claimed against the union is the loss of salary incurred by the plain-
tiff as a result of his discharge.31 Thus, the gravamen of the ·com-
plaint is not the denial of membership rights but the resulting in-
jury to the employment status. Clearly, it cannot be maintained, as 
would be necessary to satisfy the criteria articulated in Borden, 
that the focus of the suit is "the relation between the individual 
plaintiff and the union not having directly to do with matters of em-
ployment."32 
Judicial authority since Borden reinforces the conclusion that 
the Gonzales exception is not applicable to the principal case. The 
exception has been most frequently invoked as a bar to pre-emption 
in cases involving facts essentially similar to those in Gonzales: an 
expelled or suspended union member suing the union for damages 
or reinstatement. Prior to Borden, Gonzales was generally found 
to control such cases.33 In more recent decisions, governed by the 
Borden criteria, the courts have refused to apply the exception un-
less it was absolutely clear that the principal relief sought was re-
storation of membership rights.34 Consequently, where the expelled 
30. Id. at 697. See also Local 207, Int'! Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental 
Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963). In Perko, which was decided with Borden, 
an individual employee sued his union for damages, claiming that the union had 
conspired with his employer to bring about his discharge. Applying the criteria an-
nounced in Borden, the Court found that the real focus of the complaint was "inter-
ference with the plaintiff's existing or prospective employment relations." Id. at 705. 
Thus, the suit was held to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 
31. The complaint initially charged the employer, who was not a defendant, with 
having wrongfully discharged the plaintiff, thereby causing the plaintiff to lose earn-
ings totalling $6,500. This same sum was then claimed as the actual damages sustained 
by the plaintiff as a result of the union's arbitrary refusal to process fully his griev-
ance. Complaint of Plaintiff, pp. 3-4. 
32. Local 100, Plumbers Union v • .Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 697 (1963). 
33. See, e.g., .Bussy v. Local 13, Plumbers Union, 286 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961); 
Lockridge v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 84 
Idaho 201, 369 P.2d 1006 (1962); Lowery v. International .Bhd. of Boilermakers, 241 
Miss. 458, 130 So. 2d 831 (1961). 
34. Local 2, Int'l Organization of Masters v. International Organization of Masters, 
Inc., 414 Pa. 277, 199 A.2d 432 (1964), wherein the expelled members' complaint was 
purposely patterned to fall within the modified Gonzales exception. The principal 
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member has demanded pecuniary damages as either his sole35 or 
primary36 remedy, Gonzales has been rejected. Once beyond the 
facts of Gonzales and into the area of fair representation, there ap-
pears to be little precedent for applying the doctrine of that case.37 
When, as in the principal case, an individual employee has sought 
damages for his union's failure to represent him fairly in the grie-
vance procedure, Gonzales has been either rejected or ignored.88 
relief sought was restoration of membership rights, and damages were claimed only 
as an incidental remedy. The court sustained judicial jurisdiction on the ground 
that Gonzales was controlling precedent and that this case fit within its limited con-
fines. But see id. at 285, 199 A.2d at 436 (dissenting opinion arguing that Gonzales is 
no longer good authority). 
35. Spica v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 420 Pa. 907, 218 A.2d 
579 (1966); Directors Guild v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 42, 409 P.2d 934 (1966); 
Johnson v. Serbenta, 210 N.E.2d 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965); cf. Knox v. UAW, 223 
F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Mich. 1963). 
36. See Wax v. International Mailers Union, 400 Pa. 173, 161 A.2d 603 (1960), 
in which the expelled member claimed both reinstatement and damages, but the 
court refused to follow Gonzales on the ground that the principal relief sought was 
compensation for injury to the employment relation. The court declared that 
"Gonzales will at most be limited to its facts." Id. at 608. Compare Bussy v. Local 3, 
Plumbers Union, 286 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961) with Bussy v. Local 3, Plumbers Union, 
412 P.2d 907 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1966). When Bussy was originally heard by the Tenth 
Circuit, Borden had not yet been decided and the expelled member sought only 
damages. The federal court, following Gonzales, sustained judicial jurisdiction. By 
the time the suit finally worked its way back up to the Colorado Supreme Court, 
Gonzales had been modified by Borden and the plaintiff had accordingly amended 
his complaint to add a demand for reinstatement. However, the state court held 
that Gonzales would not prevent pre-emption because, despite the last minute amend-
ment, the principal relief sought by the plaintiff was still the damage remedy. 
37. In Day v. Northwest Div. 1055, 238 Ore. 624, 389 P.2d 43 (1964), a member sued 
his union for damages in a state court, claiming that the union had maliciously pro-
cured his discharge. The court held that the state had no jurisdiction, declaring 
that "Gonzales which may have supported plaintiff's claim has now been substantially 
modified if not overruled by later cases." See Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Struc-
tural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963); Union of Operating 
Engineers v. Cassida, 358 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). However, there is at 
least one area in which the Supreme Court has revived the Gonzales exception and 
given it new vitality. In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), 
the court held in the first of two alternative holdings, that a plant manager's 
suit for damages against a union, based upon the union's alleged libel of the plain-
tiff during an organization campaign, was "merely a peripheral concern of the 
LMRA" and thus, not subject to pre-emption by the NLRB. The court did not cite 
Gonzales to support its holding but relied upon the dictum in Garmon which ex-
empted matters only peripherally concerned with the LMRA from the general 
pre-emption rule therein formulated. Since Linn did not involve union-member rela-
tions, it does not directly affect the disposition of the principal case. However, it does 
indicate that the exception which originated in Gonzales may not be as narrowly 
limited as the Borden decision appeared to suggest. Compare Linn v. United Plant 
Guard Workers, supra, with Blum v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 42 N.J. 389, 
201 A.2d 46 (1964), wherein the court held that the alleged libelous activity was "not 
a peripheral concern as in Gonzales, even assuming that case to have surrived Borden 
and Perko." 
38. See Mendicki v. UAW, 61 L.R.R.M. 2142 (D. Kan. 1965); Webster v. Midland 
Elec. Coal Corp., 43 Ill. App. 2d 359, 193 N.E.2d 212 (1963); Goni-Moral v. Marley, 50 
CCH Lab. Cas. 11 51226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964); Young v. United Steelworkers, 420 Pa. 
132, 216 A.2d 500 (1966); McCaul v. Local 107, Teamsters Union, 47 CCH Lab. Cas. 
11 18137 (Pa. C.P. 1963); Tully v. Fred Olson Motor Serv., 27 Wis. 2d 476, 134 
N.W. 2d 393 (1965); cf. Mengus v. A.C.E. Freight, 53 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 ll237 
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Thus, it could be reasonably argued that, as an exception to the 
Garmon rule, Gonzales has been limited to its facts.39 However, such 
a conclusion is not a prerequisite for determining the inapplicabil-
ity of the exception to the principal case. It is sufficient to say that 
when, as in the principal case, the sole relief sought by an aggrieved 
individual against his wrongdoing union is monetary compensation 
for injury to his employment status, the Gonzales exception is inap-
posite. 
Since the Missouri Supreme Court was apparently unjustified in 
relying upon Gonzales to sustain judicial jurisdiction, the question 
of the proper forum for the plaintiff's suit remains open. The Mi-
randa theory would seem to point to exclusive Labor Board juris-
diction. However, it is doubtful, at least from the standpoint of the 
individual, that a strict rule of pre-emption in all fair representa-
tion cases would be desirable. 40 Of course, the NLRB does offer 
several significant advantages: it is less expensive, more expedient 
and probably more expert; the common worker, unable to bear the 
expense of a lengthy judicial struggle, will be well served by an 
available administrative forum. On the other hand, administrative 
relief is contingent upon the General Counsel's discretion in issuing 
a complaint and, if relief is obtained, it will be narrowly restricted 
to an award for back pay. The opportunity offered by the judicial 
(Ohio App. 1966). Compare the principal case with Owens v. Vaca, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. 
,r 19618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (lower court decision in the principal case) wherein the 
Gonzales rationale was found inappropriate in light of the Borden modifications. See 
Note, M U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 121 (1966), in which the lower court decision is noted 
with approval. But see Bailer v. Local 470, Teamsters Union, 400 Pa. 188, 166 A.2d 
343 (1960), cited by the Missouri Supreme Court to support its decision in the 
principal case. Bailer is now doubtful authority since it was decided prior to Borden 
and has apparently been disapproved in its own state. See Young v. United Steel 
Workers, 420 Pa. 132, 216 A.2d 500 (1966); Mccaul v. Local 107, Teamsters Union, 
47 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r 18137 (Pa. C.P. 1963). Moreover, the Bailer court did not ex-
pressly base its decision upon Gonzales but relied on another Pennsylvania case to 
support its decision. Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960). 
Falsetti had dicta to the effect that a member may sue his union for breach of the 
duty of fair representation in a state judicial forum. The case was subsequently 
retried in the federal courts on a fair representation theory. There, judicial jurisdic-
tion was upheld not on the Gonzales rationale, but on the basis that the suit fell 
within § !101 of the LMRA. Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, !155 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1966); 
see Comment, 26 U. Prrr. L REv. 593, 616·1'1 (1965); notes 43-50 infra and accompany• 
ing text. 
39. Some support for this contention may be found in the language of the Supreme 
Court. See Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 105 (1963), wherein 
the court described Borden as having held that "Garmon pre-empted the field where 
employees were suing unions for damages arising out of practices that were arguably 
unfair labor practices •••• " Local 100, Plumbers Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 698 
(1963) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 1519-20, suggest-
ing that later developments have rendered the reasoning in Gonzales "obsolete"; 
Note, 40 NoTRE DAME LA.w. 112 (1964). 
40. For discussion of the relative merits of the judicial and administrative remedies, 
see, e.g., .Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 1470•72, 1485, 1497, 1514-15; Cox, supra note 5, at 
172-78; Rosen, Individual Worker in the Grievance Procedure, Still .A.nother Look at 
the Problem, 24 MD. L REY. 288, 286-91 (1964). 
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forum for a worker to control his own suit, to plead his case to a 
jury, and to obtain an unlimited damage remedy may be very attrac-
tive to one who is seriously injured by his union's conduct. In the 
principal case, for example, a sympathetic jury awarded the plaintiff 
his full back pay plus $3,300 in punitive damages. Such a result 
would have been impossible if the NLRB were accorded exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
Since both the administrative and the judicial forums afford cer-
tain unique advantages to the aggrieved individual, it would appear 
that a desirable solution to the principal question would be con-
current jurisdiction in cases involving questions of fair representa-
tion. Such a solution can be achieved only if the Miranda theory is 
retained as a source of Labor Board jurisdiction but is stripped of 
its potential authority as a mandatory pre-emptive force. In order 
to reach this result, it would be necessary to bring fair representa-
tion actions within an exception to the general pre-emption rule. 
The Missouri Supreme Court attained precisely this end in the 
principal case through reliance on the Gonzales exception. However, 
application of Gonzales in this manner is not only legally question-
able, as was demonstrated above, but it is also undesirable as a 
matter of policy. The doctrine of pre-emption was designed to elimi-
nate the assertion of jurisdiction by diverse state judicial forums 
which could frustrate the evolution of a uniform federal labor law. 
Under the Gonzales exception, the state courts are free to apply their 
own law.41 It is true, of course, that if section 9 of the NLRA is 
regarded as the exclusive source of the duty of fair representation, 
federal law would govern in all forums. However, there is no cer-
tainty that a particular state court will not view the duty in terms 
of common law concepts of tort or contract.42 
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Humphrey v. 
Moore43 suggests a possible solution to the principal problem which 
would assure the aggrieved individual access to both the administra-
tive and the judicial forum while facilitating the development of 
a uniform federal labor policy. In Humphrey, an employee, threat-
ened with discharge as a result of an agreement between his union 
and employer by which the seniority rights of employees of two 
41. See Local 100, Plumbers Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963); Local 207, Int'! 
Ass'n of .Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963). 
42. See note 4 supra. In Borden, for instance, the injured member based his 
damage action against the union on state law and the state court relied on Gonzales 
to sustain judicial jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court indicated that such 
an application of state law was undesirable and, consequently, narrowed Gonzales 
to its present limited status. It is, in fact, unclear what law the Missouri court ad• 
ministered in the principal case. There was no mention of § 9 or of the duty of 
fair representation. In Gonzales, which the court found to control its decision, the 
state court had construed the member's suit to be based on a common law contractual 
theory and had applied state law. 
43. 375 U.S. 335 (1964). 
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merging companies were to be dovetailed, charged that the union 
and employer had exceeded the powers granted them by the collec-
tive bargaining contract in negotiating the agreement and that the 
union, by acting dishonestly and discriminantly in the bargaining 
process, had violated its duty of fair representation. The Court ob-
served that there are differing views as to whether breach of the duty 
of fair representation is an unfair labor practice but upheld its 
jurisdiction over the fair representation claim on the ground that 
even if a section 8 violation were present, the complaint stated a 
cause of action under section 301 of the LMRA and was, therefore, 
within an established exception to the general pre-emption doc-
trine. 44 Section 301 authorizes federal jurisdiction over suits for vio-
lation of contracts between a labor union and employer.45 Thus, 
construing Humphrey most broadly, it could be inferred that the 
duty of fair representation is derived from the collective bargaining 
agreement and that, consequently, any breach of the duty will give 
rise to a section 301 action.46 Since all section 301 actions, whether 
in a state or federal court,47 are exclusively subject to federal law,48 
such a construction of Humphrey would represent an attractive solu-
tion to the principal problem. A fair representation suit could be 
maintained in a judicial forum, despite the existence of concurrent 
jurisdiction in the NLRB, and the decision of the court would 
necessarily be rendered in accord with federal labor policy. One 
federal district court has adopted this approach to sustain judicial 
jurisdiction in a situation similar to the principal case, holding 
that an unfair representation suit by an employee, based upon his 
union's refusal to process a grievance, states a claim under section 
301.40 
44. Sec note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
45. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 30I(a), 61 Stat. 156 
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964). 
46. The majority opinion did not expressly advance the theory that the duty of 
fair representation is derived from the collective bargaining agreement. However, 
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg seemed to indicate that this may have 
been the majority rationale. Mr. Justice Goldberg, arguing that the plaintiff's claim 
could not be brought under § 301, asserted that the duty of fair representation is 
not derived from the collective bargaining agreement but implied from the federal 
labor statutes. He then proceeded to the merits of the case, thereby indicating that 
he does not consider .Miranda to have pre-emptive effect. On the other hand, Mr. Justice 
Harlan, who agreed that no § 301 cause of action was stated, refused to consider the 
merits and suggested that the case be set for reargument on the pre-emption question. 
For strong criticism of the Humphrey decision, see Van Zile, The Componential 
Structure of Labor Management Relations, 43 U. DET. L.J. 321, 341-53 (1966). 
47. It is established that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal 
courts to hear § 301 actions, Dowd Box v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1961), and that an 
individual may sue under § 301 to enforce the collective bargaining agreement, Smith 
v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). 
48. Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucus Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Textile 
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
49. Mandel v. Local 707, Teamsters Union, 246 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); cf. 
Falsetti v. Local 2026, Ul\f\V, 355 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1966); Freedman v. National 
Maritime Union, 347 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965); Tully v. Fred Olson Motor Serv., 27 
384 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65 
This broad construction of Humphrey, bringing all fair represen-
tation actions under section 301, may not be totally warranted. The 
Humphrey court stressed heavily two factual matters which, if con-
strued as limitations on the application of section 301 to fair rep-
resentation cases, would significantly narrow the scope of the deci-
sion and would, arguably, preclude use of a section 301 theory to 
sustain judicial jurisdiction in the principal case. First, the court 
appeared to deem it necessary that the employer be implicated in 
the union's breach of duty.50 However, the strained manner in 
which the court ultimately found employer complicity would seem 
to render this requirement insignificant; the employer was conce-
dedly a neutral in the union-employee dispute, was free from any 
charge of actual fraud, and was connected to the union's alleged 
misconduct only by the fact that he had continued to negotiate the 
agreement while on constructive notice of the union's bad faith.51 
It would appear difficult for the employer to escape this type of im-
plication by any behavior short of clear opposition to the union's 
position. 52 The second factual matter stressed by the court was the 
existence of an actual breach of a specific provision of the collective 
bargaining contract brought about as a result of the union's breach 
of duty.53 The court pointed out that the unfair representation, if 
proved, would render the dovetailing agreement a nullity and make 
any displacement of employees pursuant to the agreement a breach 
of contract. However, if the unfair representation alone is not a 
breach of contract, it hardly seems reasonable that a resultant or 
associated contract violation by the employer should transform the 
union's conduct into a proper subject for a section 301 action. Be-
cause of these unresolved factors, the precise scope of the Humphrey 
decision is presently unclear and will remain so until the Supreme 
Court faces a situation, like that in the principal case, in which an 
employee sues his union for breach of the duty of fair representation 
Wis. 2d 476, 134 N.W.2d 393 (1965). See also Zeaner v. Local 107, Teamsters Union, 
234 F. Supp. 901 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Addeo v. Dairymen's League, 47 Misc. 2d 426, 262 
N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
50. One federal district court has expressly adopted the view that a fair representa-
tion claim may not be based on § 301 if the employer is not joined in the action. 
Mendicki v. UAW, 61 L.R.R.M. 2142 (D. Kan. 1965). But see Mandel v. Local 707, 
Teamsters Union, 246 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Rosen, Fair Representation, 
Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions, Union Officials and the Worker 
in Collective Bargaining, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 413-14 (1964); Note, Section 301 and 
the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1238 (1965). 
51. The majority opinion in Humphrey characterized the employer as considering 
"the dispute a matter for the union to decide" and Mr. Justice Goldberg in concurrence 
described the employer as having "not willfully participated in the alleged breach of 
the union's duty." 
52. See Rosen, supra note 4, at 413-14. 
53. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Sterling, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r 11430 (8th 
Cir. 1966), affirming Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc., 243 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. 
Mo. 1965); see Chasis v. Progress Mfg. Co., 54 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r 11398 (E.D. Pa. 1966); 
cf. Longshoremen v. Kuntz, 334 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1964); Fuller v. Local 107, Teamsters 
Union, 233 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1964). 
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without joining the employer and without alleging any other breach 
of contract.r;4 
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the principal 
case.65 In view of the Court's narrow construction of the Gonzales 
exception in Borden, it would appear unlikely that the Missouri 
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the exception will be ap-
proved. If the Court does, in fact, find Gonzales inapposite, it will 
then be faced with the problems raised by the Miranda decision. 
The Court might find that Miranda is legally unsound, in which 
case, the Missouri court's holding would be affirmed for lack of any 
theory upon which to base pre-emption. On the other hand, if the 
Court approves Miranda and construes it so as to make pre-emption 
mandatory in all fair representation cases, the Missouri court will 
necessarily be reversed. If the Court chooses to extend the Humphrey 
decision to its outer limits, bringing all fair representation actions 
under section 301, then two further alternatives are suggested: 
The Court could once again avoid passing upon Miranda by holding 
that section 301 creates a judicially cognizable cause of action regard-
less of the presence or absence of an unfair labor practice; or more 
satisfactorily, the Court could recognize Miranda as a viable source 
of labor board jurisdiction in fair representation cases but utilize 
section 301 to give the courts concurrent jurisdiction. The latter 
solution would provide the aggrieved individual with access to both 
administrative and judicial forms while assuring that all decisions 
are kept within a framework of uniform national labor policy.56 
54. See Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L. 
REV. 373, 387 (1965). 
55. 85 Sup. Ct. 186 (1966). Two distinct issues were certified: (1) whether the NLRB 
has exclusive jurisdiction over a union member's damage action against union officers; 
and (2) if the Board does not have exclusive jurisdiction, whether federal law autho-
rizes a court or jury to give damages solely on the basis of testimony going to the 
merits of the grievance, in the absence of proof of bad faith or discrimination, or 
whether the courts are limited to directing the grievance to be arbitrated. Id. at 1863. 
56. There is an alternative approach to the principal case which might arguably 
be employed to avoid the pre-emption problems created by an analysis in terms of 
the duty of fair representation. Section 9 of the NLRA provides that any individual 
employee shall have the right to have grievances adjusted without the interference 
of the bargaining representative as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with 
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Read literally, this provision 
would appear to give the employee an indefeasible interest in the grievance pro-
cedure. However, the courts have refused to so construe the section and have 
consistently denied the individual any right to make an employer hear his grievance 
or to enforce submission of a grievance to arbitration. See, e.g., Black-Clawson v. 
International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962); Palnau v. Detroit Edison 
Co., 301 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1962); Rosen, Individual Worker in the Grievance Pro-
cedure, Still Another Look at the Problem, 24 Mn. L. REV. 233 (1964); Summers, supra 
note 5. But see Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963), wherein the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that § 9 does give the individual a right to adjust 
his grievance, that this right is implicit in the bargaining contract, and that refusal 
by a union or an employer to honor the right is a breach of the contract giving rise to 
an action under § 301. If this approach were adopted, a member's suit against his 
union based upon the union's failure to process his grievance fully or to allow him 
opportunity to adjust his grievance would be clearly within judicial jurisdiction. 
